We exploit naturally occurring variation in the existence, closeness, and dissemination of preelection polls to identify a causal effect of anticipated election closeness on voter turnout in Swiss referenda. Closer elections are associated with greater turnout only when polls exist. Examining within-election variation in newspaper reporting on polls across cantons, we find that close polls increase turnout significantly more where newspapers report on them most. This holds examining only "incidental" exposure to coverage by periodicals whose largest audience is elsewhere. The introduction of polls had larger effects in politically unrepresentative municipalities, where locally available information differs most from national polls.
Introduction
Voter turnout is among the political behaviors of greatest interest to social scientists. Recent empirical work has revealed much about particular drivers of the decision to vote: the effects of personality traits (Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015) , habits (Fujiwara et al., 2016) , social considerations (Gerber et al., 2008 , Funk, 2010 , and DellaVigna et al., 2016 , political movements (Madestam et al., 2013) , media content (Strömberg, 2004 , DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007 , Gentzkow, 2006 , Enikolopov et al., 2011 , and Gentzkow et al., 2011 , and compulsory voting laws (León, 2017 and Hoffman et al., 2017) . 1 Yet, there is a surprising lack of clear, causal evidence for one of the most widelydiscussed drivers of turnout: anticipated election closeness. 2 Observational studies correlating election closeness and voter turnout have been plagued by reverse causality and omitted variables bias (see, for example, Barzel and Silberberg, 1973 , Aldrich, 1976 , Cox and Munger, 1989 , Matsusaka, 1993 , and Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999 . Ex post election closeness may be an endogenous outcome of turnout; associations between ex ante closeness (i.e., as measured by polls) and turnout might reflect omitted variables such as issue type: issues about which voters are passionate may also be issues on which the electorate is more closely split. Moreover, political "supply-side" behavior might drive the empirical correlations as well: political ads may be more prevalent when elections are anticipated to be close, and ads themselves may drive turnout. 3 Aiming to test for a causal effect of anticipated election closeness using a transparent research design, a series of field experiments provide voters with information regarding election closeness (across individuals within a single election), typically finding no significant effects (Gerber and Green, 2000 , Bennion, 2005 , Dale and Strauss, 2009 , Enos and Fowler, 2016 , Gerber et al., 2017 .
However, a lack of complete experimental control makes these results difficult to interpret: null results might be driven by common information sets outside of the experiment, which would produce convergence in posterior beliefs regarding closeness at the time of the elections-and therefore similar turnout levels-between treatment and control groups. 4 1 Additional empirical evidence exists on factors affecting other political behaviors, such as contributing to a political campaign or turning out to a protest. These range from personality (Cantoni et al., 2016) to traditional and social media (Enikolopov and Petrova, 2015 , Enikolopov et al., 2016 , Durante et al., 2017 , and the behavior of other citizens (PerezTruglia and Cruces, 2015 , González, 2016 , and Cantoni et al., 2017 .
2 Such a causal effect might arise for a variety of theoretical reasons, from (perhaps flawed) instrumental calculations of costs and benefits, to intrinsic or social costs from failing to vote that vary with the closeness of the election. Canonical rational choice models (e.g., Downs, 1957) predicted that closeness, by increasing the likelihood of pivotality, will generate higher turnout; note, however, that this logic only strictly applies to small or extraordinarily close elections. Still, anticipated election closeness may cause higher turnout through other mechanisms even in large elections: social preferences (e.g., DellaVigna et al., 2016) or intrinsic utility from voting (e.g., Riker and Ordeshook, 1968 , Brennan and Buchanan, 1984 , Schuessler, 2000 , Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006 , and Ali and Lin, 2013 will generate higher turnout for closer elections if the anticipated social or intrinsic costs of not voting are higher when elections are expected to be close.
3 Coate et al. (2008) structurally estimate a model of voter turnout using data from Texas liquor referenda, finding too few close elections to fit the pivotal voter model. 4 A series of lab experiments also provide clean tests for a causal effect of anticipated closeness on turnout (e.g.,
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In this paper we exploit naturally occurring variation in the existence, closeness, and dissemination of pre-election polls, as well as naturally occurring variation in the political composition of Swiss municipalities, to identify a causal effect of anticipated election closeness on voter turnout in Swiss federal referenda. 5 These referenda are extremely high-stakes-votes in our sample shaped, among other things, Switzerland's military policy, its relationship with Europe, its immigration policy, its treatment of minority groups, and its national infrastructure-and we study political behavior within them using a novel, hand-collected dataset consisting of voter turnout, voters' perceptions of a referendum's importance, political advertising in local newspapers, poll results, and local newspapers' reporting on those polls for every Swiss referendum for which municipality-level voter turnout is available.
Relative to existing studies of the relationship between election closeness and turnout, our analysis makes two primary empirical contributions. First, in contrast to other studies exploiting naturally occurring variation, we implement a multi-pronged research design that can credibly address concerns regarding reverse causality and omitted variables. We examine variation in both ex post and ex ante closeness; we estimate models with election fixed effects, exploiting withinelection, cross-canton variation in local newspaper reporting on close pre-election polls; we take seriously the potential endogeneity of locally-available information, exploiting "incidental" variation in locally-read newspapers' reporting on polls; and, we develop and test a set of hypotheses regarding heterogeneous effects of the introduction of polls to distinguish between the effects of anticipated election closeness and potential unobserved correlates. Second, in contrast to field experimental work, we are able to exploit more pronounced differences in information sets available to voters in different locations at the time of the election, thus reducing concerns that treatment and comparison groups in the analysis will base their turnout decisions on similar information sets.
We propose that information provided by polls, disseminated by newspapers, leads voters to update their beliefs about election (referendum) closeness. We hypothesize that when a preelection poll is close and voters learn about that poll (e.g., from reading a newspaper that reports the results), voter turnout will increase. Our first approach to studying the effects of anticipated election closeness on voter turnout exploits variation in the existence of pre-election polls due to the introduction of the first widely disseminated, national-level poll in Switzerland in 1998. One would expect that in the absence of polls, voters may not be well informed about the closeness of a vote; this makes it difficult to condition their turnout on election closeness, and thus the relationship between voter turnout and the ex post closeness of an election will be weak. In contrast, when polls exist, if there is a causal effect of anticipated closeness on turnout, the better information Levine and Palfrey, 2007, Duffy and Tavits, 2008, and Agranov et al., forthcoming) . While some of these experiments have found significant, positive effects of anticipated closeness on turnout, the external validity of these results to settings outside the lab remains to be established. 5 We use the term "referenda" throughout to refer to federal referenda and initiatives. We do not consider cantonlevel referenda in our study. We discuss the institutional details of our setting in Section 2. Consistent with these predictions, evidence from a cross-vote analysis reveals that in the 1981-1998 era-before national level polls were conducted and disseminated-there is an extremely weak relationship between voter turnout and the ex post closeness of an election. In contrast, in the era with polls (1998-2014 in our sample of referenda), there exists a strong relationship between election closeness and turnout. 6 This cross-era comparison is intriguing, but it naturally raises concerns; one is that, rather than election closeness causing high turnout (and being reflected in an association between ex post closeness and turnout), instead, higher turnout may cause elections to be closer ex post.
While we cannot measure the ex ante closeness of elections prior to the introduction of polls, we can examine the cross-vote relationship between ex ante closeness from the national pre-election poll and election turnout for the 1998-2014 sample. Consistent with our predictions, we find a statistically and economically significant relationship between ex ante closeness and voter turnout: a one standard deviation increase in poll closeness (around 7 percentage points) increases turnout by around 1.5 percentage points. This is slightly larger than the effect we observe from a one standard deviation increase in newspaper political advertising, and equivalent to around a onehalf standard deviation increase in voters' assessment of the importance of a given vote. This relationship holds even when controlling for various measures of a referendum's importance to voters and for a measure of political advertising in six large, "national-level" newspapers. Finally, we find that when multiple polls were conducted prior to a referendum, the final poll released is more strongly associated with turnout than are earlier polls, as one would expect if sequential polling results were incorporated into voters' posterior beliefs regarding closeness, which then shaped turnout.
Of course, one still might be concerned that our finding of a significant cross-election relationship between poll closeness and subsequent turnout is driven by some omitted election characteristic-a referendum's "issue type" may drive both turnout and closeness, even controlling for measures of a vote's importance and political advertising. To address concerns regarding election-specific unobservables, using a canton×vote panel, we examine within-election variation in the coverage of the national-level poll by newspapers read by citizens of a canton. Importantly, newspapers were the primary source of political information among Swiss voters throughout the period we study. 7 Controlling for canton and election fixed effects-and thus purging our estimates of the effects 6 Similar in spirit to this analysis, Morton et al. (2015) show that the availability of exit poll results in French elections reduces turnout in late-voting constituencies.
7 The nationally-representative "VOX survey," conducted following each vote, asks Swiss citizens a broad range of political questions. One of these directly asks, "Through which media did you orient yourself and learn about the pros and cons of the last vote?" In each survey, newspapers were the most frequent selection, with around 80% of respondents indicating the importance of newspapers as a source of political information.
3 of a fixed (national-level) "issue type" driving turnout-we find that greater cantonal newspaper coverage of close polls significantly increases voter turnout. A one standard deviation increase in a canton's newspaper coverage of polls increases the effect of poll closeness by around 0.5 percentage points.
Observing an effect of close polls controlling for election fixed effects addresses concerns regarding election-specific unobservables that affect all of Switzerland. However, the coverage of close polls in locally read newspapers-the variation we exploit-might reflect a canton×vote-specific unobservable. We explore several possibilities.
First, there exists the possibility that our findings are driven by canton×vote-specific variation in locally-targeted political campaigning. To address this concern, we hand-collect political advertising data in the full set of 50 cantonal newspapers read by at least 10% of a canton's inhabitants in the months preceding each referendum in our sample. We then directly control for political advertising in a canton's local newspapers for a given referendum. This canton×vote control, too, does not affect our results.
Next, we consider the possibility that our results are arise from differences across Switzerland's linguistic-cultural communities, controlling for an interaction between an indicator that a canton is German-speaking with our measure of pre-election poll closeness. Again, this does not affect our findings.
Finally, we consider the possibility that our findings are driven not by information about closeness, but by correlated tastes, or persuasive information about a vote's importance, varying at the canton×vote level. To examine whether variation in exposure to information about close polls is confounded by variation in local political tastes or by exposure to persuasive information regarding a vote's importance, we directly control for voters' expressed views on a vote's importance (aggregated to the canton level for each referendum) from a nationally-representative post-vote survey. 8 If our within-election measure source of variation in beliefs about closeness-the interaction between poll closeness and newspaper coverage-merely captured unobserved canton×vote variation in a referendum's importance, controlling directly for a vote's importance should eliminate the relationship observed. In fact, controlling for the importance of a vote does not affect our findings at all.
As an alternative approach to addressing concerns that local newspaper coverage of close polls is endogenous, we exploit a canton's "incidental" exposure to poll reporting. We define "incidental" reporting on polls in a canton as poll coverage in newspapers that are read in the canton, but whose largest market is elsewhere. If newspaper editors target their news coverage (specifically poll coverage) toward their largest cantonal audience, then readers exposed to this reporting in other cantons will read it for reasons other than their own canton's election-specific interest. In principle, it is possible that cantons' interests (and news reporting) are correlated for a given election, but we find that conditional on election fixed effects (which capture the national-level interest in an issue), incidental reporting on polls in a canton is practically uncorrelated with locally-targeted reporting. We find that greater exposure to only the incidental reporting on close polls is associated with greater turnout as well. This finding is robust to all of the controls considered in our analysis of newspaper reporting more broadly.
We finally test several predictions from a simple conceptual framework that embeds our hypothesized mechanism that close polls cause voters to update their beliefs about closeness, and thus to turn out in greater numbers. In the absence of polling, it is plausible that voters will gauge an upcoming election's closeness by "locally sampling" among their friends and neighbors. This strategy will yield beliefs that match the actual national-level closeness only if the local sample is politically representative of the country as a whole. Thus, in nationally politically unrepresentative municipalities, it will not be easy for individuals to condition their turnout decision on national-level vote closeness, even if they wished to do so. On the other hand, even in the absence of polls, it will be possible for for individuals in politically representative municipalities to condition their turnout decision on national-level vote closeness. We test these three predictions using a municipality×vote panel, pooling data from the era with and without polls, and find support for all three predictions. Prior to the introduction of polls, politically unrepresentative municipalities exhibited no relationship between turnout and (ex post) closeness, while politically representative municipalities did exhibit a positive relationship. The introduction of polls had a significantly larger positive effect on the relationship between closeness and turnout in politically unrepresentative municipalities. And, in the era with polls, politically unrepresentative municipalities' relationship between closeness and turnout became statistically indistinguishable from that of politically representative municipalities: the introduction of polls produced the same closeness-turnout relationship in these different municipalities.
Examining the relationship between ex ante closeness and turnout for the era with polls reproduces the "convergence" result.
These findings represent, to our knowledge, the first credible evidence of a causal effect of 5 anticipated closeness on turnout within high-stakes, large elections. 9 While each set of results may potentially raise its own empirical concerns, our cumulative body of evidence consistently points towards a causal effect of closeness on turnout. To confound this finding, unobserved variation would have to (i) differentially and robustly drive turnout in close elections in the post-1998 era with polls; (ii) drive turnout when locally read newspapers report on the close polls under a variety of specifications; (iii) be not reflected in voters' assessment of vote importance; and, (iv) differentially alter the relationship between election closeness and voter turnout in municipalities unrepresentative of Switzerland.
As we discuss further in the conclusion, these findings have potentially important policy implications: to the extent that polls shape voter turnout, they also have the potential to affect election outcomes; thus, policies relating to the conduct of polls and their dissemination become very high-stakes, indeed.
In what follows, in Section 2, we discuss the context of our study and in Section 3, we describe our data and present summary statistics. In Sections 4, 5, and 6, we present our empirical analyses at the vote-level, canton×vote-level, and municipality×vote-level, respectively. Finally, in Section 7, we offer concluding thoughts.
Swiss National Referenda
Switzerland is a federal republic consisting of 26 cantons and 2,324 municipalities (as of 2016).
Along with a distinct federal structure, Switzerland has a long tradition of direct democracy, practiced at all three levels: federal, cantonal, and municipal. 10 The two main instruments of direct democracy at the federal level (the level on which we focus) are the popular initiative and the referendum.
Since 1891, Swiss citizens have had the right to call for a popular initiative, with which they can partially or totally revise the federal constitution, if 100,000 signatures are collected in support of the proposed initiative within 18 months. A popular initiative is accepted if the majority of Swiss citizens vote in favor, and the majority of the cantons do so as well. 11 In response to an 9 It is worth noting that our findings do not provide direct evidence either in favor of, or opposed to, the canonical pivotal voter model. But our finding of a significant causal effect of anticipated closeness on turnout in a setting in which any voter's likelihood of being pivotal is trivially small suggests that considerations other than pivotality play an important role in the link between anticipated closeness and voter turnout. 10 See https://www.ch.ch/en/political-rights/, last accessed March 12, 2017, for basic information on Swiss direct democratic institutions at the federal level. More detailed discussions of direct democracy in the Swiss Cantons can be found in Vatter (2004) and Trechsel and Serdült (1999) . 11 Technically, there are 20 cantons, each of which receives a vote, and 6 half cantons (Obwalden, Nidwalden, BaselStadt, Basel-Landschaft, Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden), each of which receives half a vote, making 23 votes in total. In nearly every case in our data, popular and cantonal majorities go hand in hand. Between 1981 and 2014 (our sample period), there were four votes (out of 280) in which a narrow majority of voters approved (between 50.9 % and 54.3 % of voters voting yes) but the cantons did not, and two votes in which a narrow majority of voters rejected (with 49.2 % and 49.9 % percent of voters voting yes) while the majority of cantons approved. Note that there is no minimum voter turnout required for the referendum to be binding. 6 initiative, the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly may propose a direct counter-proposal; usually, this is a more "moderate" proposal. 12 In addition to the popular initiative (and the counter-proposal), the Swiss constitution grants two types of referenda rights. First, a referendum can be called on all laws issued by the federal government if supported by 50,000 signatures or eight Swiss cantons. This sort of referendum is then accepted or rejected by a simple majority of the votes cast. Higher-stakes policy choices-any changes to the constitution and all international treaties-are subject to a mandatory referendum requiring a majority of voters and cantons to be passed.
Due to these diverse direct democratic instruments, Swiss citizens vote on federal ballots two to four times per year, with each voting day including votes on multiple proposals. Vote topics vary broadly, from social issues, to military policy, to infrastructure, to participation in international organizations, such as the European Economic Area. During our sample period alone In addition, most federal votes are extensively debated in the media (TV, radio and dozens of local newspapers). One noteworthy event altering the political media landscape occurred in 1998, 12 In the case of a counter-proposal, voters are currently able to approve both the initiative and the counter proposal, if both are preferred to the status quo (before 1998, voters could only approve the initiative or the counter-proposal, but not both at the same time). Voters who support both the initiative and the counter-proposal are required to indicate which they prefer to determine which is to be implemented if both initiative and counter-proposal were approved.
13 See Funk (2010) for additional institutional information and for a discussion of the different turnout effects of the introduction of voting by mail among citizens living in small and large communes.
14 The left-wing party agrees with the right-wing party on 123 votes and with the centrist party on 143 votes. 7 when the public television station decided to pay a research institute, called "gfs.bern" (or "gfs"),
to conduct the first widely-disseminated national voting forecasts conducted in Switzerland. The idea was simply to get politically relevant information to make political discussions on TV more lively, but the poll results ended up being disseminated far more broadly, through other media as well. 15 This introduction of pre-election polling provides one of the sources of variation we will exploit, allowing to split the sample period into eras with and without pre-election polls.
Further variation is generated through dissemination of these pre-election poll results. We will focus on dissemination through local newspapers, as newspapers are the most important source of information used by Swiss voters. To the extent that exposure to information regarding polls via newspapers is a noisy indicator of exposure to information regarding polls by any means, our estimates may underestimate the effects of anticipated election closeness.
Data and Summary Statistics

Voter Turnout
Electoral data for all federal votes (initiatives, counter-proposals, and referenda) are available from the website of the Swiss federal office of statistics. 16 We use data at the municipal level ( We construct voting data at the canton and federal level by aggregating the municipal level data to the larger geographical units.
Pre-Election Poll Results
Since 1998, gfs.bern has conducted surveys eliciting the voting intentions of Swiss citizens before all federal votes. As noted above, the sponsor for these surveys is Swiss Radio and TV, which receives federal money for its public service. 17 Turnout is calculated at the level of the individual referendum. In practice, turnout is very similar for all votes held on a given voting date: a regression of turnout on voting date fixed effects generates residuals with a standard deviation of 0.122 percentage points.
18 Note that there existed 2,352 municipalities in Switzerland in 2014, but no data reported for 10 of them, because they had common ballot boxes with other municipalities. Note, too, that some historical municipalities merged in our sample period. We aggregate these to construct a balanced panel based on the set of municipalities in existence in 2014. All of our results are robust to using an unbalanced panel or dropping municipalities that experienced a merger. 8 results published around 10 and 30 days prior to the voting date. The poll results are reported as the shares of eligible voters (among those who report an intention to vote), who: (i) are definitely in favor of the proposal; (ii) are somewhat in favor of the proposal; (iii) are somewhat against the proposal; (iv) are definitely opposed to the proposal; (v) do not know; or, (vi) prefer not to answer. 19 Our main variable of interest is the predicted "share yes" in the final poll prior to a vote: the total "yes" support (groups (i) and (ii), who are definitely or somewhat in favor) divided by the total number of respondents indicating support for "yes" or "no" (groups (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv)). In some analyses, we will also consider the predicted "share yes" in the earlier poll. Poll results are available from the gfs.bern website for all federal votes starting with the vote held on September 26, 2004. 20 For earlier votes, we gathered poll results through an extensive newspaper search (for details regarding our selection of newspapers, see Section 3.3).
Data on Newspaper Coverage of Polls
The Swiss Agency of Media Research (WEMF) has regularly conducted surveys on newspaper readership since the year 2000, with random samples of cantonal inhabitants interviewed and asked which newspapers they read. 21 The Agency generously shared their data on canton-level newspaper readership with us, allowing us to construct a list of newspapers read by at least 10% of a canton's inhabitants in a given year. Overall, there are 50 newspapers on this list, many of which are read in several cantons (see the Online Appendix, Table A .1, for a list of the newspapers).
To measure local coverage of pre-election polls, we count the number of times a pre-election poll was mentioned in each of these 50 newspapers between 2000 and 2014. We used three different strategies in this search: online databases, "Factiva" and "Swissdox" 22 ; newspapers' own online archives; and, manual search in the Swiss National Library in Bern.
The Political "Supply Side": Political Advertising in Newspapers
We exploit two sources on political advertising activity relevant to the referenda we study. First, data from Kriesi (2009) on political ads in in six major ("national-level") Swiss newspapers: NZZ, Blick, Tages-Anzeiger, Le Matin, Journal de Genève, and Tribune de Genève. To measure campaigning intensity before federal votes, we calculate the sum of ads placed in these six major newspapers.
As a complement to these data, we collected advertising data from a much broader set of newspapers: all of the newspapers considered in our search for coverage of pre-election polls, described in Section 3.3. We sum up to the canton×vote level our counts of political ads relating to each vote 19 Note that the poll does not project whether the referendum is likely to receive support from a majority of cantons (which technically is required to pass many of the referenda we study). As noted above, however, the popular vote has nearly always been the binding factor determining the passage of referendum; thus, information on the closeness of this component of the vote alone will be highly informative to voters. 20 
Importance of a Vote
We find it plausible that the decision to turn out to vote by a voter on the margin will be based on the "most important" vote held on a given voting date. To determine the most important voting issue on a given voting date, we combine data from several sources. First, we use responses in nationally-representative, post-election surveys (the "VOX surveys"), which have been conducted after each federal vote since 1977 (these surveys, like the pre-election polls, have been conducted by the gfs). 23 We specifically rely on survey respondents' views of the importance to the nation of each voting issue (or referendum) on a given voting date. These views have been elicited in all VOX surveys since June 6, 1993.
This survey-based measure of a vote's importance is direct, and it covers all votes in the post-1998 era with polls; however, it does not cover the earliest votes in our sample in the era without polls. Thus, we supplement the VOX survey data with a count of the number of articles mentioning each election issue in Switzerland's preeminent German newspaper, the NZZ, in the three months preceding each voting date. 24 In the absence of survey data on the importance of the various referenda held on a given voting date, the issue with the most NZZ articles is identified as the most important vote on a given voting date. For illustration, several voting dates' referenda are listed in Table 1 , along with their importance as measured in the VOX survey and in the NZZ article count. 25
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 2 ; when several votes were held on a given voting date, the variables refer to the most important vote held on that day (coded as noted in Section 3.5). At the vote level, one can see that turnout averaged around 43%, with a standard deviation of 8.5 percentage points. 23 The survey data can be found at http://forscenter.ch/en/data-and-research-information-services/ 2221-2/special-projects/vox-voxit/, last accessed March 28, 2017. 24 We checked the six "national-level" newspapers in Switzerland (NZZ, Blick, Tages Anzeiger, Le Matin, Journal de Genève, and Tribune de Genève) for an available online archive from 1981-2014, but only the NZZ had a complete archive throughout this time period. 25 In Online Appendix Table A .2, we list the "most important" votes on the 97 voting dates in our sample, 46 in the era before pre-election polls were introduced, and 51 after. Note that we can also use the NZZ article count for the entire 1981-2014 period (rather than the combination of the article count and the VOX survey) and our results are very similar.
We define our key explanatory variable, closeness, as the losing side's vote share in the referendum: the higher its value, the closer a referendum. Our measure of ex post closeness averages 36%, with a standard deviation of 9.5 percentage points. Ex ante closeness, as resulting from preelection polls, averages 37.5%, with a standard deviation of 7.5 percentage points. One can see that ex ante closeness is available for 40 votes; this is a subset of the 51 votes held after the first poll was released in 1998-not every vote in the post-1998 era had a poll conducted. The most important vote on a given voting date on average generated around 125 political ads in Switzerland's national-level newspapers; it was rated as a 7.4 on a 1-10 scale of importance for the nation, and a 5.9 on a 1-10 scale of importance for individual voters; it also generated around 60 articles in the NZZ newspaper in the three months prior to the voting date.
When examining the canton×vote level data, one sees that the most important vote on a given voting date had poll results reported in 3.5 newspaper articles read in a canton, on average. There were, on average, 70 political advertisements on the most important vote in the newspapers read in a canton, on average. Average levels of turnout and self-reported personal importance of a vote are similar in the canton×vote data to those observed in the election-level data. Finally, in the municipality×vote level data, one can see two dimensions of cross-municipality heterogeneity that we will consider: "unrepresentativeness" and "homogeneity", both of which provide an indicator of a citizen's ability to gauge national-level election closeness from local sampling of opinions. Unrepresentativeness measures the mean absolute deviation of the municipal vote share from the national vote share, across all votes in our sample period , and it averages around 9 percentage points across municipalities. Homogeneity measures a municipality's political homogeneity, defined as the mean distance from a 50-50 voting outcome, averaged across all votes between 1981 and 2014. For the average municipality, this is around 18 percentage points. Finally, we will consider heterogeneity across municipalities of different sizes, using the size of a municipality's electorate, averaged across voted from 1981 to 2014. On average, a municipality in our sample has around 2,000 eligible voters.
Vote-Level Analysis
Votes held on different issues on the same election day have nearly identical turnout, which is plausibly driven by the most important voting issue on a voting date. It would thus be inappropriate to treat each voting issue on a voting date as an independent observation. We take a conservative approach, examining closeness for one issue-the most important issue-and turnout for only that single issue on each voting date. As noted above, to determine the most important voting issue on a given voting date, we use the VOX survey responses when available and a count of the number of articles mentioning each election issue in the NZZ when the VOX data are unavailable.
Our analysis begins by examining the relationship between closeness and turnout in both the era before pre-election polls were conducted (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) and the era with pre-election polls (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . In comparisons between these two eras-pooling all elections between 1981 and 2014-we necessarily use ex post closeness (i.e., the actual election outcome) as our measure of a close election. By definition, in the era without polls we have no ex ante measure of closeness. We will also examine the era with polls alone, below, and will present associations between ex ante closeness and turnout for this period.
We begin with a very simple exercise, presenting a binned scatter plot and best-fit regression lines of: (i) residual turnout against residual election closeness (conditional on election importance) for the era without polls; and (ii) residual turnout against residual election closeness (conditional on election importance) for the era with polls (see Figure 1) . 26 The binned scatter plots tell a very clear story: in the era without polls, once one accounts for an issue's importance, there is essentially no relationship between election closeness and turnout. In contrast, when pre-election polls are released, there exists a strong association between closeness and turnout. 27 This pattern is precisely what one would expect if polls provided information about likely closeness, which led voters to update their beliefs, and to turn out more when they learned an election was likely to be close.
Of course, the scatter plots can only be suggestive of an effect of polls. Turnout may be causing ex post closeness in the era with polls, rather than closeness causing turnout. One may also wonder whether our control for an election's importance sufficiently controls for unobserved crosselection differences that may be associated with both turnout and ex post closeness. It is worth noting that for reverse causality or omitted variables bias to drive the results in Figure 1 , it would need to be the case that they were "era-varying"-differentially affecting outcomes post-1998. It
is not obvious what such an era-varying unobservable would be, but it remains an important concern.
To begin to address concerns regarding reverse causality and omitted variables, we next examine only the era with polls, allowing us to correlate ex ante closeness with turnout, ruling out reverse causality as a driver of any relationship found. We estimate the following regression model:
The model uses ex ante closeness to predict voter turnout at the vote (v) level, controlling for a vote's importance and for political advertising in national-level newspapers (both varying at the vote level).
We begin, in Table 3 , column 1, by estimating a parsimonious model in which we only control for a vote's importance using the NZZ article count as a measure of a vote's importance (to match the specification estimated in producing the binned scatter plots in Figure 1 ). One can see that 26 Our control for election importance is the mentions of a vote in the NZZ, a measure available consistently throughout the period.
27 To be precise, in a regression of turnout on importance and ex post closeness, the coefficient on ex post closeness is 0.027 (s.e.: 0.094) in the era before polls, and 0.209 (s.e.: 0.101) in the era with polls. the relationship between ex ante closeness and turnout is highly significant. In Table 3 , column 2, we add a control for a count of political advertisements related to the vote in national-level newspapers, in order to better capture cross-vote differences that might drive both turnout and closeness. We find that greater political advertising is positively (not quite statistically significantly) associated with turnout, but including it as a control does not meaningfully affect the estimated relationship between ex ante closeness and turnout. To rule out the possibility that turnout and closeness were both driven by a time trend (which might explain differing patterns pre-and post-1998), in Table 3 , column 3, we add a time trend to the specification in column 2, and continue to find a significant, positive relationship between poll closeness and subsequent turnout.
One still might be concerned about our ability to adequately control for issue type: newspaper articles about a vote are surely a noisy measure. Fortunately, for votes in the era with polls, we have a more direct measure of the importance of a vote, from the VOX survey. Voters' self-reported views on the importance of an issue are indeed more predictive of turnout than the count of newspaper articles about the election (the R-squared jumps when using the former).
However, using the VOX survey measure of importance instead of the newspaper measure does not weaken the estimated relationship between poll closeness and turnout. Just the opposite: in Table 3 , columns 4-6, one can see that the estimated coefficient on closeness is slightly larger and more precisely estimated.
Our findings in the cross-vote analysis are consistent with voters incorporating poll results into their posterior beliefs regarding closeness, which then shape turnout. An auxiliary prediction of this hypothesized process is that polls conducted closer to the actual vote should be more predictive of voter turnout than polls conducted earlier-the former send a clearer signal regarding closeness than do the latter. In Table 4 , we explore this prediction; we first replicate the most parsimonious and most demanding specifications from Table 3 , columns 4 and 6, but using the subset of votes for which multiple polls were conducted (see Table 4 , columns 1 and 2). We then estimate these same specifications, but using the earliest poll available for each most important vote, rather than the latest poll available. As one would expect, closeness in these earlier polls is positively associated with turnout, but less strongly so than for the later polls (see Table 4 , columns 3 and 4). When both early and late polls are included as explanatory variables in the same regression, closer later polls predict turnout quite strongly, and earlier polls have very little additional predictive power (see Table 4 , columns 5 and 6).
Canton×Vote-level analysis
Our cross-vote analysis addressed several important concerns in interpreting raw correlations between voter turnout and election closeness-particularly, reverse causality and several specific concerns about omitted variables. However, one might still be concerned that there exist electionlevel unobservables that we failed to account for that drove the post-1998 association we observed 13 between ex ante closeness and turnout. One strategy for addressing concerns about election-level unobservables is to examine within-vote variation in exposure to information that shapes beliefs about vote closeness. We do this next, exploiting variation across cantons in the newspaper reporting on polls for a given vote.
Using our canton×vote panel data, we test whether there exists a differential positive relationship between ex ante poll closeness and turnout in cantons with greater reporting on polls in local newspapers, controlling for vote fixed effects-and thus a national-level "issue type"-as well as canton fixed effects. We estimate the following model:
where turnout cv is the turnout rate (in percent) in canton c for vote v, α c are a set of canton fixed effects, and δ v are a set of vote fixed effects. The interaction closeness v × coverage cv is the explanatory variable of interest, with the coefficient β 1 telling us whether close polls have a differential impact on turnout specifically when they are covered more by a canton's newspapers. We also include the lower order term coverage cv , which tells us how a canton's newspapers' coverage of polls with closeness equal to zero affects turnout; we do not include closeness v as it is absorbed by the vote fixed effects.
In Table 5 , Panel A, column 1, we present the results from estimating equation 2. We find that, consistent with information about close polls affecting turnout, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between closeness and coverage is positive and statistically significant. The interaction between poll closeness and newspaper coverage of polls is also practically important: in a canton with one standard deviation greater news coverage of a poll, a one standard deviation closer poll (7.5 percentage points) is associated with around a 0.5 percentage point (= 7.5 × 1 × 0.062) increase in voter turnout. In results not shown, the coefficient on coverage cv (i.e., the effect of coverage of polls at closeness equal to zero) is negative and significant, equal to -2.14. Closeness equal to zero is far outside the observed range of vote closeness, of course; at the mean level of closeness (37.5), the effect of a standard deviation greater coverage of polls on turnout is around 0.19, and is statistically not different from 0. At maximal closeness (a vote share of 50 for the losing side), the effect of a standard deviation greater coverage of polls on turnout is a statistically significant full percentage point (p = 0.023).
Observing an effect of close polls controlling for vote fixed effects addresses concerns regarding vote-specific unobservables that affect all of Switzerland. One might wonder, however, whether the coverage of close polls in locally-read newspapers-the variation we exploit-reflects a canton×vote-specific unobservable. We explore several possibilities in the subsequent columns of Table 5 .
First, we consider the possibility that political campaigning targeted locally is associated with local newspaper coverage of polls and with turnout. To account for locally-targeted political cam-paigning, we hand-collect political advertising data in the full set of 50 cantonal newspapers read by at least 10% of a canton's inhabitants in the month preceding each referendum in our sample.
We then directly control for political advertising in a canton's newspapers for a given referendum.
As can be seen in Table 5 , Panel A, column 2, this control, too, does not affect our results.
Differences across Switzerland's linguistic-cultural communities represent another possible source of variation in both newspaper poll coverage and voter turnout. For example, perhaps newspapers read by German-speaking Swiss are more likely to report on close polls and Germanspeaking Swiss are also more likely to turn out to vote in close elections, but the former does not cause the latter. To account for differences in turnout across linguistic-cultural communities depending on a vote's closeness, we control for an interaction between an indicator that a canton is German-speaking with our measure of pre-election poll closeness. Again, this does not affect our findings (column 3).
Finally, we consider the possibility that our findings are driven by variation in an issue's perceived importance at the canton×vote level. This variation might be due to differences in preferences across cantons: cantons whose voters particularly care about the outcome of a vote will likely exhibit both greater newspaper coverage of polls and higher turnout. Differences in perceived issue importance at the canton×vote level might also arise from differences in exposure to information affecting perceptions of a vote's importance. Newspaper articles or political advertisements affecting perceptions of a vote's importance might drive turnout, and might also come alongside articles reporting on polls' closeness.
To determine whether variation in exposure to information about close polls is confounded by variation in a canton's political preferences or by exposure to information regarding a vote's importance, we directly control for voters' expressed views on a vote's importance, aggregated to the canton level for each referendum. 28 If our within-vote source of variation in beliefs about closeness-the interaction between poll closeness and newspaper coverage-merely captured unobserved canton×vote variation in a referendum's importance, controlling directly for a vote's importance should eliminate the relationship observed. In fact, controlling for the importance of a vote does not affect our findings at all (column 4).
As a final robustness check, we control for all three of the alternative mechanisms we proposed: political advertising; linguistic-cultural differences; and, variation in perceived referendum importance. Accounting for all three of these channels does not affect our results (column 5).
While the analysis in Table 5 provides evidence against several confounding factors, one still might be concerned about the endogenous reporting on close polls at the canton×vote level. It is natural to think that newspaper editors will choose to publish articles on close polls specifically in cantons where voters are particularly attuned to an election. While we aim to account for this using our canton×vote measure of a issue's importance, that control might be imperfect.
As an alternative approach to addressing concerns regarding the endogenous local newspaper coverage of close polls, we exploit a canton's voters' (arguably) "incidental" exposure to polls.
The thinking behind "incidental" exposure is as follows: if newspaper editors target their news coverage (specifically, poll coverage) toward their largest cantonal audience, then readers exposed to this reporting in other cantons will read it for reasons other than their own canton's electionspecific interest.
For illustration, consider a stylized example based on the two Swiss cantons of Aargau and Zurich. Aargau is a relatively small (population around 650,000), German-speaking canton. Zurich is also a German-speaking canton, and is the largest canton in Switzerland (population around 1.5 million). In Table 6 , we present a list of the newspapers read by at least 10% of the population of each canton; because both cantons are German-speaking, it is unsurprising that some newspapers read by at least 10% of the population of one canton are also read by at least 10% of the population in the other. One can see in the Table, however, that there are also some Zurich-only newspapers and some Aargau-only papers.
Now consider our assignment of newspapers to the categories of "endogenous" or "incidental." We assume that an editor targets endogenous news toward the interests of the canton with the largest number of readers of his newspaper. In our example, the targeted canton is Zurich for the newspapers read only in Zurich, Aargau for the newspapers read only in Aargau, and
Zurich for the newspapers read in both Zurich and (the much smaller) Aargau. This leaves us-in this stylized example-with no exogenous news in Zurich, and with exogenous news arriving in
Aargau from the newspapers read in both Aargau and Zurich.
In practice, to calculate incidental news coverage of polls, we find the largest readership group across all cantons for each newspaper in each year, and drop all newspaper mentions of polls in the canton that has a given newspaper's largest population of readers. Other cantons reading that newspaper will be exposed to that newspaper's poll coverage incidentally, providing us with our measure of incidental coverage. 29 While in principle it is possible that a canton's "endogenous" poll coverage (that is, coverage specifically targeting that canton's readers) could be strongly correlated with a canton's "incidental" coverage (coverage arguably targeting a different canton's readers), we find that incidental coverage of polls in our data is practically uncorrelated with endogenous coverage (the correlation is -0.036). We thus examine the impact of incidental coverage of pre-election polls at the canton×vote level, possibly a "cleaner" source of variation in exposure to information regarding the closeness of an upcoming election.
In Table 5 , Panel B, we present estimates from specifications analogous to the ones in Panel A, but exploiting within-election variation in exposure to incidental coverage of pre-election polls. 29 We present each canton's endogenous and incidental exposure to newspaper coverage of polls in Online Appendix Figure A. 1.
Looking at the results in column 1, one can see that the interaction between poll closeness and (incidental) newspaper coverage of polls is statistically significant, about 25% smaller than the coefficient in Panel A. Note that this does not necessarily imply that the coefficient in Panel A was biased: our measure of incidental poll coverage necessarily excludes coverage of polls in widelyread newspapers, which would plausibly have the largest effect on turnout.
In columns 2-5, we replicate the same robustness checks discussed above in the context of Panel A. The inclusion of a variety of controls accounting for alternative mechanisms has only a small effect on the estimated coefficient on the interaction between poll closeness and (incidental) newspaper coverage of polls, though in one case no longer statistically significant.
The result in Panel B, columns 4 and 5, are particularly noteworthy: one might have been concerned that editors not only target readers in a particular canton, but also more broadly target the interests of readers from a particular linguistic-cultural community. This would mean that some of the variation in poll coverage we capture in our measure of incidental exposure was, in fact, targeted. It is thus reassuring that including an interaction between an indicator that a canton is German-speaking with our measure of pre-election poll closeness does not affect our results.
As a final exercise with the canton×vote data, we use incidental exposure to poll coverage as an instrument for total exposure (and the interaction between poll closeness and incidental newspaper coverage of polls as an instrument for the interaction between poll closeness and total newspaper coverage of polls). In Table 7 , we first show the first stage estimates, which are strong.
Importantly, the coefficient on incidental articles on polls in the first stage predicting total articles on polls is not greater than 1, suggesting that an additional incidental article is not associated with more endogenous articles. 30 The IV estimate (using the empirical specification from Table 5 , column 5) is somewhat larger than the OLS, suggesting that in a canton with one standard deviation greater news coverage of a poll, a one standard deviation closer poll is associated with around a 1 percentage point increase in voter turnout. 31 That the IV estimate is greater than the OLS estimate suggests two possibilities. First, endogenous coverage of close polls may be greater when turnout is lower for other reasons: newspaper editors may wish to stimulate turnout when they believe it will be lower than they think it ought to be. Second, measurement error-certainly a concern given our measure of newspaper articles as a source of information on polls-biases the OLS estimates downward. 30 The p-value from a one-sided test is < 0.10. 31 As in the OLS regressions, we do not report the estimated coefficient on coverage cv in the second stage, as it estimates the effect of coverage at closeness equal to zero, which is far out of sample. The effect of a standard deviation increase in coverage on turnout at mean closeness (37.5) is -0.49 percentage points (p = 0.246). At maximal closeness (50), the effect of a standard deviation increase in coverage on turnout is 1.12 percentage points (p = 0.154).
Municipality×Vote-level analysis
Our proposed mechanism behind the findings presented thus far is that pre-election polls provide information on the closeness of an upcoming election, with close polls causing voters to update their beliefs, and to increase their turnout. Such a mechanism implies auxiliary predictions regarding heterogeneity in the impact of the information provided by polls; we test these auxiliary predictions next.
In the absence of information from national, pre-election polls, it is plausible that voters will gauge an upcoming election's closeness by "locally sampling" among their friends and neighbors. This strategy will yield beliefs that match the actual national-level closeness only if the local sample is politically representative of the country as a whole. In municipalities that are more politically representative of Switzerland, it may be possible for voters to condition their turnout decision on an informative signal of national-level vote closeness-even in the absence of polls.
In politically unrepresentative municipalities, it will not be easy for individuals to condition their turnout decision on national-level vote closeness in the absence of polls, even if they wished to do so.
Local sampling to gauge closeness in the absence of polls-and the use of polls to gauge closeness when polls exist-should produce several clear patterns in the data: (i) in the era before polls exist, there may exist a relationship between election closeness and turnout in more politically representative municipalities, but there should not be a strong relationship between closeness and turnout in politically unrepresentative municipalities; (ii) because a national poll has a larger effect on voters' information sets in politically unrepresentative municipalities, the introduction of pre-election polls should have a significantly larger effect on the relationship between election closeness and turnout in politically unrepresentative municipalities; and, (iii) if voters in politically representative and politically unrepresentative municipalities all condition their turnout decisions on national level poll results, which supersede the locally-available information, there should be convergence toward the same turnout effect of election closeness in the era with polls.
One can see suggestive evidence of these patterns in simple scatter plots: when one examines the relationship between ex post closeness and turnout (conditional on a vote's importance) prior to the introduction of polls, one sees a weak, positive relationship in municipalities above the median in representativeness, and a weak, negative relationship in municipalities below the median in representativeness (see Panel A of Figure 2 ). After polls were introduced, the relationship between ex post closeness and turnout becomes strong and positive in both unrepresentative and representative municipalities-and there is essentially complete convergence (see Panel B of Figure 2 ). One can also examine the relationship between ex ante closeness and turnout in the era with polls, and one can see that this looks very similar for unrepresentative and representative municipalities.
We test our three predictions more rigorously using a municipality×vote panel, pooling data from the era with and without polls (and thus using an ex post measure of election closeness), and estimating the following model with municipality fixed effects:
We first estimate the model without election fixed effects to allow us to separately identify the level effect of election closeness on turnout in the era with and without polls. Subsequently, we will also estimate equation 3 including election fixed effects, exploiting only variation across municipalities within election.
It is useful to match the conceptual framework's hypotheses to regression coefficients. Prediction (i) suggests a positive, possibly significant, coefficient on closeness v (β 1 > 0); as well as a significant and negative coefficient on closeness v × unrepresentative m (β 2 < 0). Prediction (ii) implies a positive and significant coefficient on closeness v × unrepresentative m × PollEra v (β 3 > 0). Prediction (iii) suggests that the sum of the coefficients on closeness v × unrepresentative m × PollEra v and closeness v × unrepresentative m will be insignificantly different from zero (that is, a failure to reject β 2 + β 3 = 0). In a model with election fixed effects, we can test the second (stronger) part of prediction (i), as well as predictions (ii) and (iii).
In Table 8 , column 1, we present results from estimating equation 3. One can see in the table that the predictions suggested by our mechanism are all confirmed. First, in the era before national level polls were released, in a municipality with an average (i.e., "0") level of political unrepresentativeness, there is a positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship between ex post closeness and turnout. More unrepresentative municipalities exhibit a statistically significantly weaker relationship between ex post closeness and turnout. The introduction of polls, indeed, is associated with a differentially large (and statistically significant) increase in the relationship between closeness and turnout in more unrepresentative municipalities. We also find that the introduction of polls produced "convergence" in the relationship between closeness and turnout across municipalities: the increase in the effect of closeness on turnout in unrepresentative municipalities has statistically closed the gap that existed in the era prior to the existence of polls.
In Table 8 , column 2, we estimate the same specification, but include election fixed effects. Because our coefficients of interest are all higher-order interaction terms, our hypothesis tests are unaffected. 32 One question about our findings is whether they are simply picking up political differences between large and small municipalities. To explore this possibility, we control for the "triple interaction" among closeness, municipality electorate size, and a Poll Era dummy (closeness v × electorate m × PollEra v ) as well as all of the lower-order terms. 33 One can see in Table 8 , column 3, that including these controls does not affect our results.
We can also consider an alternative source of variation in individuals' ability to draw clear inferences regarding election closeness from local sampling: municipality political homogeneity.
Local sampling of political opinion in a very homogeneous population will not be able to provide a clear signal regarding election closeness, while in a more heterogeneous population, one might be able to determine whether an election is likely to be close. We thus have very similar predictions regarding municipality political homogeneity to those tested regarding municipality political unrepresentativeness. We conduct exercises identical to those in Table 8 , but substituting a municipality's political homogeneity for its representativeness, and find very similar results (see the Online Appendix, Table A .4). We thus find quite robust evidence of behavior precisely in line with a model in which polls shape voters' beliefs about election closeness, and thus shape the turnout decision.
Conclusion
We identify an effect of anticipated election closeness on voter turnout that is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful. The effect on turnout of a one standard deviation increase in poll closeness-1.5 percentage points-is slightly larger than the effect of a one standard deviation increase in political ads in newspapers and similar to the effect of a half standard deviation increase in voters' assessment of the importance of a given vote. Newspaper reporting on polls is also important: we find that a one standard deviation higher level of coverage of a one standard deviation closer poll increases turnout by 0.5 to 1 percentage point.
That anticipated closeness, shaped by the existence and dissemination of polls, causally affects voter turnout begs the question of whether polls affect electoral outcomes. While homogeneous responses to a single, uniformly disseminated poll would leave the electorate unchanged, variation in results across polls and heterogeneous newspaper coverage of polls will produce different expectations of election closeness across locations, and across voters who read different newspapers. These voters will likely also have different political preferences (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010) , thus shaping the composition of the voting electorate.
Our analysis thus complements existing work on the importance of information and media in political behavior. While much of this work has focused on persuasive information in newspapers, on television, or in advertisements, our findings indicate that information about an election's competitiveness can shape political behavior as well. In a context of increased political polarization (e.g., Boxell et al., 2017) , persuasion aimed at changing the ideological composition of the entire electorate may be less effective, making the turnout margin-changing the ideological composition of the voting electorate-potentially more important than in the past.
Though beyond the scope of our analysis, and admittedly quite speculative, an application to We believe our work can be extended in several directions. Further understanding the effect of polls on electoral outcomes, beyond the effect on voter turnout levels, is an important avenue for future research. Also, given that rational calculations of pivotality are unlikely to explain the turnout effects we find in large elections, we believe there is scope for more theoretical and empirical work on alternative voting models based on social and intrinsic motives. Tables   FIGURE 1: EX POST CLOSENESS AND TURNOUT -BEFORE AND AFTER INTRODUCTION Notes: NZZ Mentions measures the number of times a vote was mentioned in the NZZ newspaper in the three months preceding the voting day. Importance of Vote (VOX) measures individuals' self-reported importance of the vote for the country on a 0-10 scale (10 indicating maximal importance). Notes: Each column presents results from an OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the vote level reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is Municipal Level Voter Turnout. Ex Post Closeness is the losing side's vote share in the final result of the election. Unrepresentativeness is a standardized measure of the similarity between a municipality's voting outcomes and Switzerland's voting outcomes as a whole. Poll Era is a dummy variable equal to 1 for votes held after the introduction of national pre-election polls in 1998. Column (3) controls for the "triple interaction" among closeness, municipality electorate size, and a Poll Era dummy (closeness v × electorate m × PollEra v ) as well as all of the lower-order terms. Sample of votes is restricted to the most important vote per voting day, selected on self-reported importance in VOX surveys. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Notes: Each column presents results from an OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the vote level reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is Municipal Level Voter Turnout. Ex Post Closeness is the losing side's vote share in the final result of the election. Political Homogeneity is a standardized measure of the municipality's historical tendency to produce voting results farther from 50-50. Poll Era is a dummy variable equal to 1 for votes held after the introduction of national pre-election polls in 1998. Column (3) controls for the "triple interaction" among closeness, municipality electorate size, and a Poll Era dummy (closeness v × electorate m × PollEra v ) as well as all of the lower-order terms. Sample of votes is restricted to the most important vote per voting day, selected on self-reported importance in VOX surveys. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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